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Introduction
Since the late 1980s, it has become a widespread practice that retailers charge slotting fees to place manufacturers'products on the shelves. The amount of slotting allowances di¤ers widely across product categories and manufacturers within the same product category (FTC 2003: 15) . 1 The emergence of slotting allowances is often associated with the increasing buyer power of retailers (e.g., Bloom et al. 2000) , even though large retailers with tremendous bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers, e.g. Wal-
Mart and Costco, never charge slotting fees (FTC 2001: 18) . 2 Thus, retailer buyer power does not provide a comprehensive explanation for the use of slotting allowances as well as the di¤erence in their amount.
Moreover, it is controversial whether powerful manufacturers are more or less likely to pay slotting fees. 3 In this paper, we provide a new rationale for the use of slotting allowances that is based on consumer shopping behavior. Consumers increasingly prefer to concentrate a substantial part of their weekly grocery purchases with a single trip to one retailer. 4 Accordingly, their shopping baskets include items from various product categories as well as multiple items from the same product category. 5 This implies that the purchase decision of a so-called one-stop shopper depends on the price for the whole shopping basket rather than individual product prices. One-stop shopping behavior, therefore, induces complementarity between products o¤ered at a retail outlet that are initially independent or substitutable.
Taking the consumer preference for one-stop shopping explicitly into account, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party negotiation framework. 6 Precisely, we consider a monopolistic retailer that negotiates sequentially with two suppliers about two-part 1 In the U.S., the amount of slotting fees per item, per retailer and per metropolitan area ranges between $2,313 and $21,768 (FTC 2003: vii).
2 "Wal-Mart reportedly makes a point of avoiding schedules of allowances and discounts and insists instead on receiving the single best price that a supplier can o¤er. A representative of Costco gave a similar description of his …rm's policy once it has selected an item that it wants to buy: '[W]e really don't require any fees. We just want the best price that they can give us'" (FTC 2001: 18) . 3 Focusing on new products, Rao and Mahi (2003) …nd that powerful suppliers are less likely to pay slotting fees. In turn, both White et al. (2000) and Bone et al. (2006) …nd that smaller manufacturers are less likely to pay slotting fees.
Furthermore, the FTC (2003: vii) reports that retailers even waive or reduce slotting fees for "suppliers that do not pay slotting allowances to any retailer". 4 In the UK, about 70% of the consumers practice this so-called one-stop shopping behavior, covering about 80% of their weekly expenditures for fast-moving consumer goods on a weekly main trip (Competition Commission 2000: 24-26). 5 For categories such as carbonated soft drinks, ready-to-eat cereals, canned soups, and cookies, consumers regularly purchase multiple products from the same category (Dubé 2004: 66) . 6 Slotting allowances are represented by negative …xed fees (see Sha¤er 1991 , Chu 1992 2 tari¤ delivery contracts. 7 The suppliers' products are either independent, i.e. belonging to di¤erent product categories, or substitutes, i.e. belonging to the same product category. We show that the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is always upwards distorted if the goods are initially independent or-in the case of initial substitutes-su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. In other words, the …rst wholesale price is upwards distorted as long as the complementary e¤ect resulting from consumer onestop shopping behavior outweighs the original substitution e¤ect. In this case, a higher wholesale price of the …rst good reduces the demand for both goods o¤ered by the retailer. As a consequence, the second supplier contributes less to the joint pro…t with the retailer, enabling the retailer and the …rst supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. This mechanism applies within a category for su¢ ciently di¤eren-tiated goods as well as across categories. To compensate the retailer for the upwards distorted wholesale price, the …rst supplier has to pay a slotting fee as long as its bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer is su¢ ciently low. Thus, slotting fees are not used to exploit those suppliers that pay them. They are rather the result of a rent-shifting mechanism, which is to the detriment of those suppliers that do not pay slotting fees. 8 Our …ndings account for some of the stylized facts of slotting allowances. First, we show that slotting allowances are less likely to emerge if the retailer has strong bargaining power-at least vis-à-vis the second supplier-as this results in a less distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation. Moreover, our results reveal that a …rst supplier with strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer does not pay slotting fees. Second, we show that the retailer prefers to negotiate …rst with a less powerful supplier in order to extract rent from the more powerful second supplier. Accordingly, powerful suppliers are less likely to pay slotting fees if the retailer can choose the order of negotiations. Overall, our …ndings account for the fact that some manufacturers pay slotting fees, while others do not pay them. We may, thus, explain the di¤erence of slotting allowances across and within product categories (see FTC 2003: 15) .
This paper contributes to the literature on slotting fees based on the strategic use of contracts in vertically related industries. 9 Sha¤er (1991) shows that slotting fees can constitute a facilitating mechanism for softening competition in downstream markets. 10 In addition, Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) …nd that more intense retail competition, higher retail …xed costs and stronger retailer buyer power have a positive impact on slotting allowances. 11 While these articles relate the emergence of slotting allowances to downstream competition, we explain slotting allowances as a result from a rent-shifting mechanism in a framework with a downstream monopoly. Furthermore, our …ndings reveal that powerful retailers do not charge slotting fees to their suppliers. 12 This outcome is similar to the …ndings of Marx and Sha¤er (2010) , who analyze a multistage contracting game with a downstream retailer and two upstream manufacturers of two independent goods. Before sequential negotiations about e¢ cient delivery contracts take place, each supplier bids to obtain a slot in the retailer's assortment. If the retailer o¤ers only one slot, the manufacturers compete for access to the retailer's shelves, resulting in the payment of slotting allowances by one supplier. Within this framework, Marx and Sha¤er (2010) …nd that the stronger the bargaining position of the retailer the less likely is the retailer to limit shelf space in order to extract rent from the suppliers. Our rent-shifting mechanism, however, does not rely on the scarcity of shelf space but rather on consumer one-stop shopping behavior. 13 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify our model. In Section 3, we solve the game for subgame perfect equilibria.
In Section 4, we analyze the drivers of slotting allowances. Thereby, we also address the implications of a ban of slotting allowances and the order of negotiations for slotting allowances. Finally, we summarize our results, discuss the limitations of our model and conclude. They analyze a bilateral monopoly where the upstream …rm and the downstream …rm agree on a two-part tari¤ and where the upstream …rm has to invest in noncontractible sales o¤ers. 1 3 In contrast to Marx and Sha¤er (2010) , the contracts in our framework are not e¢ cient. Accordingly, we show that slotting allowances increase consumer prices as the quantity of the …rst supplier's product is downwards distorted in order to extract surplus from the second supplier. Negotiation outcomes are observable and both the suppliers and the retailer are fully committed to these contracts. Furthermore, the contract with the …rst supplier cannot be contingent on the quantity the retailer purchases from the second supplier. 15 Each retailer-supplier pair aims at maximizing its respective joint pro…t when determining the wholesale price. 16 The surplus is divided such that each party gets its disagreement payo¤ plus a share of the incremental gains from trade, with the proportion i 2 [0; 1] going to the supplier and the proportion 1 i going to the retailer. In the case of i = 0 the retailer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the supplier U i ; while the opposite holds for i = 1: The asymmetries in the trading parties' bargaining strength rely on several exogenously given factors, such as di¤erences in their impatience to reach an agreement or their beliefs concerning the probability of negotiation breakdown (Binmore et al. 1986 ).
The Model
Consumer utility is given by
with x 0 denoting the consumption of a numeraire and with x 1 and x 2 referring to the consumed quantities of goods 1 and 2. The parameter 2 [0; 1) indicates the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2: For = 0; the goods are independent and, thus, belong to two di¤erent product categories, while they are substitutes and, thus, belong to the same product category for > 0. As approaches 1; the more products 1 and 2 are substitutable. Note that the degree of substitutability between the products o¤ered is not related to the bargaining power of each supplier i . 
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The consumers are uniformly distributed with density one along a line of in…nite length. Their individual location is denoted by 2 ( 1; 1). The numeraire is available everywhere along the line, while consumer goods 1 and 2 have to be purchased at the retail store located at D : Without loss of generality, we assume D = 0: Consumers incur transportation cost t per unit distance. Thus, a consumer located at bears shopping costs of j j t. This implies that consumers purchase the two goods in one single shopping trip if they are available at the retailer. 18 Given that the price for the numeraire is normalized to one and that consumers are identical in income I; the utility-maximizing quantities of a consumer located at are given by
where p 1 and p 2 denote the prices of good 1 and 2; respectively. Consumers refrain from shopping at the retailer if their utility from local consumption and, thus, from purchasing only the numeraire exceeds their maximal utility from buying at the retailer, i.e.
The set of consumers being indi¤erent between buying at the retailer or not is denoted by
which is given by the unique positive solution of
Note that the market size, i.e. 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ) ; is increasing in the consumer gross utility from purchasing at the retailer. Since consumer gross utility is decreasing in the substitutability of products, i.e.
@U (x 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 )=@ < 0; the market size is decreasing in . Likewise, an increase in transportation costs negatively a¤ects the market size, without having an impact on the utility-maximizing demand of any individual consumer:
Combining (2) and (4), the overall demand for good i is given by
with :
1 8 This speci…cation allows us to get simple computable results. We would obtain similar outcomes if consumers were heterogeneous in their consumption but identical in their locations, i.e. incurring the same transportation cost to reach the retailer. In Appendix B, we extend the model to the case where only a share of consumers purchase both goods, while the other share buy one good only. 1 9 To simplify notations, some arguments are omitted in the demand functions.
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The demand functions are continuous in all variables. Moreover, an increase in p j has two countervailing e¤ects on the overall demand for good i; 20 i.e.
Due to the complementary e¤ect induced by consumer one-stop shopping behavior, a higher p j induces a higher price for the whole shopping basket such that fewer consumers are willing to buy at the retailer.
This implies that an increase in p j negatively a¤ects the market size, i.e. @ (p 1 ; p 2 ) =@p j < 0. In the case of independent goods, we, thus, have
instead, the goods are imperfect substitutes, i.e. @x i (p 1 ; p 2 )=@p j > 0; the overall demand for good i reacts ambiguously to an increase in p j : As long as the products are strongly di¤erentiated, i.e.
relatively low, the complementarity e¤ect outweighs the substitution e¤ect. The substitution e¤ect, however, dominates if the products are highly substitutable, i.e. su¢ ciently high. Precisely, we have
Consider now the case where the retailer only o¤ers good 1. Consumer gross utility from consumption, then, refers to
yielding the utility-maximizing demand functions
Accordingly, we denote the set of consumers who are indi¤erent between purchasing at the retail store or staying with local consumption of the numeraire by (p 1 ; 1), which is given by the unique positive solution of
The overall market demand for good 1, then, refers to
and :
2 0 See Stahl (1987) for more details on these e¤ects. More generally, for an early account of consumer shopping behavior and the related positive demand externalities see Stahl (1982) and Beggs (1994) .
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Analogously, the overall market demand for good 2 if the retailer does not sell good 1 is given by
Using our assumptions, we obtain the gross revenue the retailer earns when selling both products, i.e.
Analogously, the retailer's gross revenue when selling only good 1 is given by
while it refers to
if the retailer only sells good 2.
Equilibrium Analysis
To solve for the equilibrium strategies of the retailer and the two suppliers, we proceed by backward induction since our solution concept is subgame perfection.
Downstream Prices. In the last stage of the game, the retailer sets the prices for good 1 and 2; taking the contracts with each supplier as given. Maximizing the retailer's pro…t when selling both products, i.e. R(p 1 ; p 2 ) P 2 i=1 F i , with respect to p 1 and p 2 ; we obtain the equilibrium downstream prices p 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) and p 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ):
21 Denoting X i (p 1 ; p 2 ) := X i (w 1 ; w 2 ) and R (p 1 ; p 2 ) := R(w 1 ; w 2 ); the reduced pro…t functions of the downstream and the upstream …rms are given by
2 1 Due to our simple representation of consumer behavior (linearity of the individual demand functions and separability of the utility function) the price of one product is independent of the other product's wholesale price. Accordingly, the equilibrium prices are given by
8 if the retailer sells both goods. If the retailer sells only good 1; the respective reduced pro…t functions are given by
while the upstream …rm U 2 makes zero pro…t, i.e.
U2
1;0 = 0: Analogously, if the retailer sells only good 2; the respective reduced pro…t functions are given by 
Solving (22) for the equilibrium wholesale price w 2 and the equilibrium …xed fee F 2 , we obtain: Proof. See Appendix A.
As the outcome of the second negotiation does not a¤ect the contract chosen in the …rst stage, the retailer and the second supplier have no incentive to distort the respective wholesale price. Accordingly, they choose a wholesale price that maximizes their joint pro…t, i.e. w 2 = c: The …xed fee is then used to share the joint pro…t. Precisely, the retailer pays a lump-sum fee F 2 (w 1 ) to the supplier U 2 which corresponds to the supplier's incremental contribution to the joint pro…t, weighted according to the supplier's respective bargaining power. 
where the pro…ts of the upstream supplier U 1 and the downstream retailer are given by
= R(w 1 ; c) F 1 2 (R(w 1 ; c) R(w 1 ; 1)) and
Maximizing (23) with respect to w 1 and F 1 and rearranging terms, the equilibrium …xed fee is obtained
( 1 1 ) (w 1 c)X 1 (w 1 ; c):
Using (26), the equilibrium wholesale price w 1 is implicitly given by
The 
Proof. See Appendix A.
If the retailer has take-it-or-leave-it power vis-à-vis the second supplier, i.e. 2 = 0; the retailer implements a wholesale price as to maximize the overall industry pro…t, i.e. w 1 = c: For 2 > 0; however, the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is either upwards or downwards distorted. The direction of the distortion depends on the sign of X = X 1 (w 1 ; c) X 1 (w 1 ; 1) because of @X 1 (w 1 ; c)=@w 1 < 0:
If the goods are initially independent and, thus, belong to di¤erent product categories (i.e. = 0), we have x 1 (w 1 ; c) = x 1 (w 1 ; 1): 23 Since (w 1 ; c) (w 1 ; 1) > 0 due to the complementarity e¤ect induced by consumer one-stop shopping behavior, we obtain X > 0: The wholesale price is, therefore, upwards distorted, resulting in a lower demand for both goods. Accordingly, the second supplier contributes less to the joint pro…t with the retailer, enabling the retailer and the …rst supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. instead, the goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the complementary e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect, implying an upwards distorted wholesale price (Figure 1 ). In either case, a higher degree of distortion in the …rst negotiation reduces the incremental gains from trade of the retailer and the second supplier, which enables the retailer and the …rst supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. 24 For close substitutes, our results are in line with previous work on sequential contracting and rentshifting mechanisms in intermediate goods markets, showing that the quantity of the …rst supplier's product is upwards distorted when delivery contracts are not contingent on one another (Marx and Sha¤er 1999 ). In contrast, we identify a rent-shifting mechanism for independent and su¢ ciently di¤erentiated goods, which is based on an upwards distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation.
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold k that is implicitly given by X 1 (w 1 ; c) X 1 (w 1 ; 1); where for all < k ( k ) the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is upwards (downwards)
distorted. The extent of distortion is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e.
Our results further reveal that the distribution of bargaining power between the retailer and the two suppliers has no impact on the direction of the distortion, i.e. either upwards or downwards. However, the bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e. 2 ; a¤ects the extent of distortion (see (28)). As a distorted wholesale price induces ine¢ ciencies, the retailer and the …rst supplier have little incentive to distort the wholesale price if the retailer has already strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the second supplier. Thus, the lower the retailer's bargaining power in the negotiations with the second supplier the more the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation is distorted. 25 
Slotting Allowances
Given the distortion of the wholesale price w 1 and the distribution of bargaining power between the retailer and the …rst supplier, the …xed fee can be either positive, indicating a payment by the retailer, or negative, indicating a slotting fee to be paid by the …rst supplier. The retailer never charges slotting fees if it has take-it-or-leave-it power vis-à-vis the second supplier, i.e. 2 = 0: The reason is that the retailer and the …rst supplier are able to fully extract rent from the second supplier. Accordingly, there is no need to distort the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation. Furthermore, slotting allowances never smaller the share of one-stop shoppers the lower the distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier (see Appendix B). A numerical analysis is available on request. However, the wholesale price for the good in category A is always upwards distorted as the categories are initially independent.
emerge if the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation is downwards distorted, i.e. for 2 > 0 and k :
Otherwise, the …rst supplier's participation constraint would be violated.
If, instead, the wholesale price is upwards distorted, i.e. 2 > 0 and < k , the …rst supplier bene…ts from a positive price-cost margin, which makes the emergence of slotting fees possible. Precisely, the …rst supplier pays a slotting fee as long as its bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer is su¢ ciently low.
Rearranging (26), the equilibrium …xed fee is given by
That is, the …xed fee such that
Slotting allowances are more likely to emerge the more di¤erentiated the products are, i.e. @ k 1 ( ; 2 ) =@ < 0; as the upwards distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is the stronger the more the products are di¤erentiated. This implies that slotting allowances are rather the result of rentshifting across categories than within categories. Our results further reveal that the distortion of the …rst wholesale price is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier (see Proposition 1). Slotting allowances are, therefore, more likely to be charged from the …rst supplier the stronger the bargaining position of the second supplier, i.e. @ 
Proposition 4 If slotting fees are not feasible, the equilibrium wholesale price in the …rst negotiation is
given by e w 1 < w 1 for < k ; 2 > 0 and 1 < k 1 ( ; 2
If the ban of slotting fees is binding, the wholesale price is the only instrument the retailer and the …rst supplier can use to divide their joint pro…t and to extract rent from the second supplier. Accordingly, e w 1 is less distorted than if slotting allowances were feasible, i.e. e w 1 < w 1 : Furthermore, the wholesale price is increasing in 1 to account for the bargaining power of the …rst supplier. The less distorted e w 1 results in a rise of both consumer surplus and industry pro…t. In particular, the second supplier bene…ts from a less distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation. That is, a lower wholesale price in the …rst negotiation improves the marginal contribution of the second supplier to the joint pro…t with the retailer.
Correspondingly, the retailer loses if a ban of slotting allowances is enforced and binding. The pro…t of the …rst supplier is, however, ambiguously a¤ected by a ban of slotting allowances. The …rst supplier is better o¤ when paying a slotting fee as long as its bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, while it is better o¤ under a ban of slotting allowances if its bargaining power is close to k 1 ( ; 2 ).
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Retailer' s Preferred Order of Negotiations. So far, we have taken the order of negotiations as given. Assuming that the suppliers di¤er in their exogenously given bargaining power and that supplier U 1 is less powerful than supplier U 2 , i.e. 1 < 2 , we allow the retailer to decide about the order of negotiations.
Proposition 5
The retailer prefers to negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier in order to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the stronger supplier.
If the retailer negotiates …rst with the more powerful supplier U 2 , the distortion of the wholesale price enables the retailer and supplier U 2 to extract part of the rent from the less powerful supplier U 1 .
Inverting the order of negotiations, i.e. letting the retailer negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier U 1 , and assuming that the wholesale price determined in the …rst negotiation remains the same as in the case where the retailer negotiates …rst with U 2 ; the retailer and the …rst supplier extract the same amount of rent from the supplier U 2 . However, compared to the case where the retailer negotiates …rst with U 2 ; the retailer is better o¤ negotiating …rst with U 1 as it shares the extracted rent with the less powerful supplier. Moreover, as the retailer and the less powerful supplier U 1 agree on a more distorted wholesale price (see Proposition 2), which allows to shift more rent from the second supplier, the retailer's preference to negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier becomes even more pronounced. The retailer, thus, prefers to negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier. These …ndings are in line with Marx and Sha¤er (2007a) , who analyze the retailer's preferred order of negotiations in a three-party framework. In contrast to our model, they allow for contracts that are e¢ cient and lead to full rent extraction from the second supplier, while in our framework only partial rent extraction is possible. 28 Our results further reveal that slotting fees are more likely to occur if the retailer negotiates …rst with the less powerful supplier, i.e. supplier U 1 : That is, slotting fees arise for 1 < k 1 ( ; 2 ) if the retailer negotiates …rst with supplier U 1 ; while they arise for 2 < k 2 ( ; 1 ) if the retailer negotiates …rst with supplier U 2 . As the threshold k i ( ; j ) ; i = 1; 2; i 6 = j; is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier j (see Proposition 1), we have
Corollary 1 If the retailer decides about the order of negotiations, slotting fees are more likely to occur.
Conclusion
Taking into account consumer preferences for one-stop shopping, we show that slotting allowances may result from a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party framework. Thereby, slotting fees are not used to exploit those suppliers that pay them. They are rather the result of a rent-shifting mechanism at the expense of those suppliers that do not pay slotting fees. Overall, slotting fees can be used to shift rent across categories as well as across manufacturers of su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products in the same product category. Furthermore, we show that slotting allowances come along with a welfare loss as they are induced by an upwards distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation.
Our results critically depend on the observability of contracts and the players' commitment to the contracts. In the case of simultaneous negotiations or secret contracts, the retailer would purchase the e¢ cient quantity of any product (Bernheim and Whinston 1985) . Moreover, our results are restricted to the assumption of two-part tari¤s. This assumption implies that there are only two instruments available to control three objectives, i.e. the maximization of the overall joint pro…t, the division of surplus between the …rst supplier and the retailer, as well as the extraction of surplus from the second supplier. Accordingly, distortion arises both on and o¤ the equilibrium path. Considering more general contracts which allow for di¤erent payments on and o¤ equilibrium, the retailer and the …rst supplier are able to fully disentangle their three objectives. Accordingly, the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is never distorted in such a framework. The same holds if the contract with the …rst supplier is contingent on the quantity purchased from the second supplier. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium contract induces the e¢ cient quantity along the equilibrium path, while the distortion is only arising "out of equilibrium" to extract second manufacturer's surplus. 29 However, such contracts require that the …rst supplier veri…es the quantity negotiated with the second supplier, which is rather di¢ cult and costly in reality.
Finally, our analysis is restricted to the case of a monopolistic retailer. Showing that one-stop shopping may cause slotting allowances in the case of a retail monopoly, we expect that retail competition reinforces the complementarity e¤ect making slotting fees more likely. This would be an interesting task for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. Maximizing (22) with respect to w 2 and F 2 ; we obtain the following …rst-order
Using (31) and (32), we easily obtain
implying
Using (34) and applying the envelope theorem, we get
2 9 For more details, see Marx and Sha¤er (2008) or Marx and Sha¤er (2007a) .
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The equality is ful…lled for
Combining (36) together with (32), we obtain
Proof of Proposition 1. Maximizing (23) with respect to w 1 and F 1 , we obtain the following …rst-order conditions
Using (38) and (39) and applying the envelope theorem, the equilibrium wholesale price w 1 is given by
Using (39), the equilibrium …xed fee is given by
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the existence of k ; we reformulate (28) and obtain
with : (w 1 ) = 0:
Substituting w 1 = c; we get
implying (c; ) Q 0 for all R k := 1 + p 2: Assuming concavity of the objective function, i.e. the Nash product formalized in (23), 30 the equilibrium wholesale price satis…es
To analyze comparative statics, i.e. @ jw 1 cj =@ 2 > 0; we apply the implicit function theorem to (42) .
Due to the concavity of (42), we have sign
The analysis of X 1 (w 1 ; c) X 1 (w 1 ; 1) reveals that @ (w 1 ; 2 )=@ 2 < 0 if X 1 (w 1 ; c) X 1 (w 1 ; 1) < 0 and 3 0 The concavity has been checked by simulations. 
Since
For any < k , we have 
This holds since @F 1 =@w 1 > 0 and @w 1 =@ < 0 for su¢ ciently low.
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove the …rst part of Proposition 4, i.e. e w 1 < w 1 ; we di¤erentiate (30) with respect to w 1 ; getting
with: (w 1 )j w1= e w1 = 0: Using previous results, we get 
(1 i ) j [R(w i ; c) R(w i ; 1)] ; i = 1; 2; i 6 = j:
We denote the wholesale prices negotiated with the …rst supplier by b w i : Assuming 1 < 2 , we have 0 < j b w 2 cj < j b w 1 cj (see Proposition 1) since the distortion of the wholesale price in the …rst stage is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier. Thus, to prove 
Since ( 
We rewrite (53) by @A (w 1 ) =@w 1 @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 = 0; where A (w 1 ) denotes the industry surplus and B (w 1 ) the incremental contribution of the second supplier. Using @A (w 1 ) =@w 1 < 0; @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 < 0 and @A (w 1 ) =@w 1 @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 > 0 for any w 1 < w 1 ; the concavity of the objective function reveals A (c) A (w 1 ) < B (c) B (w 1 ) 8 w 1 < w 1 :
Since j b w 2 cj < jw 1 cj (see Proposition 1), we obtain
Rewriting (55), we get 
Hence, we have Since @X 1 (w 1 ; c)=@w 1 < 0; the direction of the distortion of w 1 still depends on the sign of X = X 1 (w 1 ; c) X 1 (w 1 ; 1): This implies that Proposition 2 still holds if not all consumers purchase both products within the category. In other words, the threshold k remains the same as in our basic framework, i.e. k = 1 + p 2: However, the share of one-stop shoppers a¤ects the extent of the distortion.
For < k ; the wholesale price w 1 is increasing in ; while it is decreasing in for k (see Figure   2 ). 
